# 8. Technological shift and labour markets

KAT.TAL.322 Advanced Course in Labour Economics

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
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# Technological shift and the labour market Today

- Stylised facts
- Canonical model
- Task-based model
- Empirical results

# Stylised facts

## Labour market of educated workers



Source: Figures 1 and 2 (Acemoglu and Autor 2011)

#### Overview

- Two types of labour: high- and low-skill
   Typically, high edu and low edu (can be relaxed)
- Skill-biased technological change (SBTC)
   New technology disproportionately ↑ high-skill labour productivity
- High- and low-skill are imperfectly substitutable Typically, CES production function with elasticity of substitution  $\sigma$
- Competitive labour market

#### Production function

$$Y = \left[ (A_L L)^{\frac{\sigma - 1}{\sigma}} + (A_H H)^{\frac{\sigma - 1}{\sigma}} \right]^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma - 1}}$$

- ullet  $A_L$  and  $A_H$  are **factor-augmenting** technology terms
- $\sigma \in [0, \infty)$  is the elasticity of substitution
  - $\rightarrow \sigma > 1$  gross substitutes
  - $\rightarrow \sigma < 1$  gross complements
  - $\rightarrow \sigma = 0$  perfect complements (Leontieff production)
  - $\rightarrow \sigma \rightarrow \infty$  perfect substitutes
  - $\rightarrow \sigma = 1$  Cobb-Douglas production

#### Rationalisation of CES production function

- 1. Single output Y; H and L are imperfect substitutes
- 2. Two goods  $Y_H=A_HH$  and  $Y_L=A_LL$ ; CES utility of consumers  $\left[Y_L^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}}+Y_H^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}}\right]^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}}$
- 3. Combination of the 1. and 2.

Supply of H and L assumed inelastic  $\Rightarrow$  study only firm side

### Equilibrium wages

$$w_{L} = A_{L}^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} \left[ A_{L}^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} + A_{H}^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} \left( \frac{H}{L} \right)^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} \right]^{\frac{1}{\sigma-1}}$$

$$w_{H} = A_{H}^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} \left[ A_{L}^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} \left( \frac{H}{L} \right)^{-\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} + A_{H}^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} \right]^{\frac{1}{\sigma-1}}$$

Comparative statics:

- $\frac{\partial w_L}{\partial H/L} > 0$  low-skill wage rises with  $\frac{H}{L}$
- $\frac{\partial w_H}{\partial H/L}$  < 0 high-skill wage falls with  $\frac{H}{L}$
- $\frac{\partial w_i}{\partial A_L} > 0$  and  $\frac{\partial w_i}{\partial A_H} > 0$ ,  $\forall i \in \{L, H\}$

### Skill premium

$$\frac{w_H}{w_L} = \left(\frac{A_H}{A_L}\right)^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} \left(\frac{H}{L}\right)^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}}$$

#### $\Delta$ relative supply

$$\frac{\partial \ln \frac{w_H}{w_L}}{\partial \ln \frac{H}{L}} = -\frac{1}{\sigma} < 0$$

#### $\Delta$ technology

$$\frac{\partial \ln \frac{w_H}{w_L}}{\partial \ln \frac{A_H}{A_L}} = \frac{\sigma - 1}{\sigma} \le 0$$

- Gross substitutes:  $\sigma > 1 \Rightarrow \frac{\partial \ln w_H/w_L}{\partial \ln A_H/A_L} > 0$
- Gross complements:  $\sigma < 1 \Rightarrow \frac{\partial \ln w_H/w_L}{\partial \ln A_H/A_L} < 0$
- Cobb-Douglas:  $\sigma=1\Rightarrow \frac{\partial \ln w_H/w_L}{\partial \ln A_H/A_L}=0$

# Tinbergen's race in the data

# Katz and Murphy (1992)

The log-equation of skill premium is extremely attractive for empirical analysis

$$\ln \frac{w_{H,t}}{w_{L,t}} = \frac{\sigma - 1}{\sigma} \ln \left( \frac{A_{H,t}}{A_{L,t}} \right) - \frac{1}{\sigma} \ln \left( \frac{H_t}{L_t} \right)$$

Assume a log-linear trend in relative productivities

$$\ln\left(\frac{A_{H,t}}{A_{L,t}}\right) = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 t$$

and plug it into the log skill premium equation:

$$\ln \frac{w_{H,t}}{w_{L,t}} = \frac{\sigma - 1}{\sigma} \alpha_0 + \frac{\sigma - 1}{\sigma} \alpha_1 t - \frac{1}{\sigma} \ln \left( \frac{H_t}{L_t} \right)$$

# Tinbergen's race in the data

Katz and Murphy (1992)


Estimated the skill premium equation using the US data in 1963-87

$$\ln \omega_t = \cos + 0.027 \times t - 0.612 \times \ln \left(\frac{H_t}{L_t}\right)$$

Implies elasticity of substitution  $\sigma \approx \frac{1}{0.612} = 1.63$ 

Agrees with other estimates that place  $\sigma$  between 1.4 and 2 (Acemoglu and Autor 2011)

# Tinbergen's race in the data



Source: Figure 19 (Acemoglu and Autor 2011)

Very close fit up to mid-1990s, diverge later

Fit up to 2008 implies  $\sigma \approx 2.95$ 

Accounting for divergence:

- non-linear time trend in  $\ln \frac{A_H}{A_L}$  brings  $\sigma$  back to 1.8, but implies  $\frac{A_H}{A_L}$  slowed down
- differentiate labour by age/experience as well

### Summary


- 1. Simple link between wage structure and technological change
- 2. Attractive explanation for college/no college wage inequality<sup>1</sup>
- 3. Average wages  $\uparrow$  (follows from  $\partial w_i/\partial A_H$  and  $\partial w_i/\partial A_L$ )

However, the model cannot explain other trends observed in the data:

- 1. Falling  $w_L$
- 2. Earnings polarization
- 3. Job polarization


Also silent about endogeneous adoption or labour-replacing technology.


# Unexplained trend: falling real wages



Source: Figure 1 (Autor 2019)


# Unexplained trend: earnings polarization





Source: Figure 8 (Acemoglu and Autor 2011)

# Unexplained trend: job polarization



1989-1999 -- 1999-2007

Source: Figure 10 (Acemoglu and Autor 2011)

#### Overview

Task is a unit of work activity that produces output

Skill is a worker's endowment of capabilities for performing tasks

### Key features:

- 1. Tasks can be performed by various inputs (skills, machines)
- 2. Comparative advantage over tasks among workers
- 3. Multiple skill groups
- 4. Consistent with canonical model predictions

### Production function

Unique final good Y produced by continuum of tasks  $i \in [0,1]$ 

$$Y = \exp\left[\int_0^1 \ln y(i) di\right]$$

Three types of labour: H, M and L supplied inelastically.

$$y(i) = A_L \alpha_L(i)l(i) + A_M \alpha_M(i)m(i) + A_H \alpha_H(i)h(i) + A_K \alpha_K(i)k(i)$$

- ullet  $A_L$  ,  $A_M$  ,  $A_H$  ,  $A_K$  are factor-augmenting technologies
- $\alpha_L(i), \alpha_M(i), \alpha_H(i), \alpha_K(i)$  are task productivity schedules
- l(i), m(i), h(i), k(i) are production inputs allocated to task i


#### Comparative advantage assumption

 $\alpha_L(i)/\alpha_M(i)$  and  $\alpha_M(i)/\alpha_H(i)$  are continuously differentiable and strictly decreasing.

### Market clearing conditions

$$\int_0^1 l(i)\mathrm{d}i \le L \qquad \int_0^1 m(i)\mathrm{d}i \le M \qquad \int_0^1 h(i)\mathrm{d}i \le H$$

#### Equilibrium without machines



Note that boundaries  $I_L$  and  $I_H$  are endogenous

This gives rise to the substitution of skills across tasks

### Law of one wage

Output price is normalised to 1 
$$\Rightarrow \exp\left[\int_0^1 \ln p(i) di\right] = 1$$

All tasks employing a given skill pay corresponding wage

$$w_{L} = p(i)A_{L}\alpha_{L}(i), \qquad \forall i \in [0, I_{L}]$$

$$w_{M} = p(i)A_{M}\alpha_{M}(i), \qquad \forall i \in (I_{L}, I_{H}]$$

$$w_{H} = p(i)A_{H}\alpha_{H}(i), \qquad \forall i \in (I_{H}, 1]$$

#### Skill allocations

Given the law of one wage, we can show that

$$l(i) = l(i') \qquad \Rightarrow \qquad l(i) = \frac{L}{I_L} \, \forall i \in [0, I_L]$$

$$m(i) = m(i') \qquad \Rightarrow \qquad m(i) = \frac{M}{I_H - I_L} \, \forall i \in (I_L, I_H]$$

$$h(i) = h(i') \qquad \Rightarrow \qquad h(i) = \frac{H}{1 - I_H} \, \forall i \in (I_H, 1]$$

Endogenous thresholds: no arbitrage

Threshold task  $I_H$ : equally profitable to produce with either H or M skills

$$\frac{A_M \alpha_M (I_H)M}{I_H - I_L} = \frac{A_H \alpha_H (I_H)H}{1 - I_H}$$

Similarly, for  $I_L$  :

$$\frac{A_L \alpha_L (I_L) L}{I_L} = \frac{A_M \alpha_M (I_L) M}{I_H - I_L}$$

### Endogenous thresholds: no arbitrage




Figure 22 Determination of equilibrium threshold tasks.


Comparative statics: wage elasticities

$$\frac{d \ln w_{H}/w_{L}}{d \ln A_{H}} > 0 \qquad \frac{d \ln w_{M}/w_{L}}{d \ln A_{H}} < 0 \qquad \frac{d \ln w_{H}/w_{M}}{d \ln A_{H}} > 0$$

$$\frac{d \ln w_{H}/w_{L}}{d \ln A_{M}} \lessapprox 0 \qquad \frac{d \ln w_{M}/w_{L}}{d \ln A_{M}} > 0 \qquad \frac{d \ln w_{H}/w_{M}}{d \ln A_{M}} < 0$$

$$\frac{d \ln w_{H}/w_{L}}{d \ln A_{L}} < 0 \qquad \frac{d \ln w_{M}/w_{L}}{d \ln A_{L}} < 0 \qquad \frac{d \ln w_{H}/w_{M}}{d \ln A_{L}} > 0$$

## Comparative statics: $\uparrow A_H$



Source: Figure 25 (Acemoglu and Autor 2011)

# Task replacing technologies

Start from initial equilibrium without machines



Assume in  $[\underline{I}, \overline{I}] \subset [I_L, I_H]$  machines outperform M. Otherwise,  $\alpha_K(i) = 0$ .



How does it change the equilibrium?

# Task replacing technologies



Assume comparative advantage of H over M stronger than M over L



- 1.  $w_H/w_M$  increases
- 2.  $w_M/w_L$  decreases
- 3.  $w_H/w_L \uparrow (\downarrow)$  if  $|\beta'_L(I_L)I_L| \stackrel{<}{>} |\beta'_H(I_H)(1-I_H)|$

# Endogenous supply of skills

Each worker j is endowed with some amount of each skill  $l^j, m^j, h^j$ 

Workers allocate time to each skill given

$$t_{l}^{j} + t_{m}^{j} + t_{h}^{j} \leq 1$$

$$w_{L} t_{l}^{j} t^{j} + w_{M} t_{m}^{j} m^{j} + w_{H} t_{h}^{j} h^{j}$$

Comparative advantage:  $rac{h^j}{m^j}$  and  $rac{m^j}{l^j}$  are decreasing in  $m{j}$ 

Then, there exist  $J^{\star}\left(rac{w_{H}}{w_{M}}
ight)$  and  $J^{\star\star}\left(rac{w_{M}}{w_{L}}
ight)$ 

#### Illustration in the data

Suppose 
$$\uparrow A_H \Rightarrow \uparrow \frac{w_H}{w_M}, \downarrow \frac{w_M}{w_L}$$
.


Use occupational specialization at some t=0 as comparative advantage.

•  $\gamma^i_{sejk}$  share of 1959 population employed in i occupations,  $\forall i \in \{H,M,L\}$ 

$$\Delta w_{sejk\tau} = \sum_{t} \left[ \beta_t^H \gamma_{sejk}^H + \beta_t^L \gamma_{sejk}^L \right] 1 \{ \tau = t \} + \delta_\tau + \phi_e + \lambda_j + \pi_k + e_{sejk}$$

Descriptive regression informed by the model!

#### Illustration in the data



Source: Table 10 (Acemoglu and Autor 2011)

### Summary

- 1. A rich model that can accommodate numerous scenarios
  - a. Outsourcing tasks to lower-cost countries
  - b. Endogenous technological change
  - c. Creation of new tasks
- 2. Useful tool to study effect on inequality and job polarization


# Empirical results

#### Environment

Multi-sector model with imperfect substitution between inputs


Task displacement<sub>g</sub><sup>direct</sup> = 
$$\sum_{i \in I} \omega_g^i \frac{\omega_{gi}^R}{\omega_i^R} \left( -d \ln s_i^{L, \text{ auto}} \right)$$

- $\omega_g^i$  share of wages earned by worker group g in industry i (exposure to industry i) at t=0
- $\frac{\omega_{gi}^R}{\omega_i^R}$  specialization of group g in routine tasks R within industry i at t=0
- $-d \ln s_i^{L,\, {
  m auto}}$  % decline in industry i's labour share due to automation
  - 1. attribute 100% of the decline to automation
  - 2. predict given industry adoption of automation technology




Source: Figure 4 (Acemoglu and Restrepo 2022)


### Task displacement



Source: Figure 5

### Task displacement and changes in real wages






Source: Figure 6 (Acemoglu and Restrepo 2022)

### General equilibrium results




Source: Figure 7 (Acemoglu and Restrepo 2022)

#### Model fit







Source: Table VIII

# Summary

Two theories linking technological advancements and labour markets

- Canonical model (SBTC)
  - → Simple application of two-factor labour demand theory
  - → Empirically attractive characterization of between-group inequality
  - → Fails to account for within-group inequality, polarization, and displacement
- Task-based model (automation)
  - → Rich model linking skills to tasks to output
  - → Explains large share of changes in the wage structure since 1980s

Next lecture: Labour market discrimination on 22 Sep

# Appendix: derivation of wage equations

The firm problem is to choose entire schedules  $(l(i), m(i), h(i))_{i=0}^1$  to

$$\max_{(l(i),m(i),h(i))_{i=0}^{1}} PY - w_{L}L - w_{M}M - w_{H}H$$

We normalised P=1. Consider FOC wrt  $\boldsymbol{l(i)}$ :

$$\frac{Y}{y(i)}A_L\alpha_L(i)=w_L, \qquad \forall i\in[0,I_L]$$

In equilibrium, all L-type workers must be paid same amount  $\Rightarrow$ 

$$p(i)A_L\alpha_L(i) = w_L, \quad \forall i \in [0, I_L]$$

Similar argument for  $w_M$  and  $w_H$  .

# Appendix: derivation of skill allocations

Given the law of one price (wage) we can also write that

$$p(i)\alpha_L(i)l(i) = p(i')\alpha_L(i')l(i'), \quad \forall i, i' \in [0, I_L]$$

Given the Appendix: derivation of wage equations, it implies that

$$l(i) = l(i') = l, \quad \forall i, i' \in [0, I_L]$$

Plug it into the market clearing condition for  $oldsymbol{L}$ 

$$L = \int_0^{I_L} l(i) di = l \cdot I_L \quad \Longrightarrow \quad l(i) = l = \frac{L}{I_L}, \forall i \in [0, I_L]$$

Similar argument for  $m(i) = \frac{M}{I_H - I_L}$  and  $h(i) = \frac{H}{1 - I_H}$ .

# References

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