KAT.TAL.322 Advanced Course in Labour Economics
September 17, 2025
Source: Figures 1 and 2 (Acemoglu and Autor 2011)
Two types of labour: high- and low-skill
Typically, high edu and low edu (can be relaxed)
Skill-biased technological change (SBTC)
New technology disproportionately ↑ high-skill labour productivity
High- and low-skill are imperfectly substitutable
Typically, CES production function with elasticity of substitution σ
Competitive labour market
Y=[(ALL)σ−1σ+(AHH)σ−1σ]σσ−1
AL and AH are factor-augmenting technology terms
σ∈[0,∞) is the elasticity of substitution
Supply of H and L assumed inelastic ⇒ study only firm side
wL=Aσ−1σL[Aσ−1σL+Aσ−1σH(HL)σ−1σ]1σ−1wH=Aσ−1σH[Aσ−1σL(HL)−σ−1σ+Aσ−1σH]1σ−1
Comparative statics:
wHwL=(AHAL)σ−1σ(HL)−1σ
Δ relative supply
∂lnwHwL∂lnHL=−1σ<0
Δ technology
∂lnwHwL∂lnAHAL=σ−1σ≶0
The log-equation of skill premium is extremely attractive for empirical analysis
lnwH,twL,t=σ−1σln(AH,tAL,t)−1σln(HtLt)
Assume a log-linear trend in relative productivities
ln(AH,tAL,t)=α0+α1t
and plug it into the log skill premium equation:
lnwH,twL,t=σ−1σα0+σ−1σα1t−1σln(HtLt)
Estimated the skill premium equation using the US data in 1963-87 lnωt=cons+0.027(0.005)×t−0.612(0.128)×ln(HtLt)
Implies elasticity of substitution σ≈10.612= 1.63
Agrees with other estimates that place σ between 1.4 and 2 (Acemoglu and Autor 2011)
Very close fit up to mid-1990s, diverge later
Fit up to 2008 implies σ≈ 2.95
Accounting for divergence:
non-linear time trend in lnAHAL
brings σ back to 1.8, but implies AHAL slowed down
differentiate labour by age/experience as well
However, the model cannot explain other trends observed in the data:
Also silent about endogeneous adoption or labour-replacing technology.
Source: Figure 1 (Autor 2019)
Source: Figure 8 (Acemoglu and Autor 2011)
Source: Figure 10 (Acemoglu and Autor 2011)
Task is a unit of work activity that produces output
Skill is a worker’s endowment of capabilities for performing tasks
Key features:
Unique final good Y produced by continuum of tasks i∈[0,1]
Y=exp[∫10lny(i)di]
Three types of labour: H, M and L supplied inelastically.
y(i)=ALαL(i)l(i)+AMαM(i)m(i)+AHαH(i)h(i)+AKαK(i)k(i)
AL,AM,AH,AK are factor-augmenting technologies
αL(i),αM(i),αH(i),αK(i) are task productivity schedules
l(i),m(i),h(i),k(i) are production inputs allocated to task i
Comparative advantage assumption
αL(i)/αM(i) and αM(i)/αH(i) are continuously differentiable and strictly decreasing.
Market clearing conditions
∫10l(i)di≤L∫10m(i)di≤M∫10h(i)di≤H
Lemma 1
Given comparative advantage assumption, there exist IL and IH such that
Note that boundaries IL and IH are endogenous
This gives rise to the substitution of skills across tasks
Output price is normalised to 1 ⇒exp[∫10lnp(i)di]=1
All tasks employing a given skill pay corresponding wage
wL=p(i)ALαL(i),∀i∈[0,IL]wM=p(i)AMαM(i),∀i∈(IL,IH]wH=p(i)AHαH(i),∀i∈(IH,1]
Given the law of one wage, we can show that
l(i)=l(i′)⇒l(i)=LIL∀i∈[0,IL]m(i)=m(i′)⇒m(i)=MIH−IL∀i∈(IL,IH]h(i)=h(i′)⇒h(i)=H1−IH∀i∈(IH,1]
Threshold task IH: equally profitable to produce with either H or M skills
AMαM(IH)MIH−IL=AHαH(IH)H1−IH
Similarly, for IL:
ALαL(IL)LIL=AMαM(IL)MIH−IL
dlnwH/wLdlnAH>0dlnwM/wLdlnAH<0dlnwH/wMdlnAH>0dlnwH/wLdlnAM⪋0dlnwM/wLdlnAM>0dlnwH/wMdlnAM<0dlnwH/wLdlnAL<0dlnwM/wLdlnAL<0dlnwH/wMdlnAL>0
Source: Figure 25 (Acemoglu and Autor 2011)
Start from initial equilibrium without machines
Assume in [I_,ˉI]⊂[IL,IH] machines outperform M. Otherwise, αK(i)=0.
How does it change the equilibrium?
Assume comparative advantage of H over M stronger than M over L
Each worker j is endowed with some amount of each skill lj,mj,hj
Workers allocate time to each skill given
tjl+tjm+tjh≤1wLtjllj+wMtjmmj+wHtjhhj
Comparative advantage: hjmj and mjlj are decreasing in j
Then, there exist J⋆(wHwM) and J⋆⋆(wMwL)
Suppose ↑AH⇒↑wHwM,↓wMwL.
Use occupational specialization at some t=0 as comparative advantage.
Δwsejkτ=∑t[βHtγHsejk+βLtγLsejk]1{τ=t}+δτ+ϕe+λj+πk+esejkτ
Descriptive regression informed by the model!
Source: Table 10 (Acemoglu and Autor 2011)
Multi-sector model with imperfect substitution between inputs
Task displacementdirectg=∑i∈IωigωRgiωRi(−dlnsL,autoi)
ωig - share of wages earned by worker group g in industry i
(exposure to industry i)at t=0
ωRgiωRi - specialization of group g in routine tasks R within industry i at t=0
−dlnsL,autoi - % decline in industry i’s labour share due to automation
attribute 100% of the decline to automation
predict given industry adoption of automation technology
Source: Figure 5
Source: Figure 7 (Acemoglu and Restrepo 2022)
Two theories linking technological advancements and labour markets
Canonical model (SBTC)
Task-based model (automation)
Next lecture: Labour market discrimination on 22 Sep
The firm problem is to choose entire schedules (l(i),m(i),h(i))1i=0 to
max(l(i),m(i),h(i))1i=0PY−wLL−wMM−wHH
We normalised P=1. Consider FOC wrt l(i):
Yy(i)ALαL(i)=wL,∀i∈[0,IL]
In equilibrium, all L-type workers must be paid same amount ⇒
p(i)ALαL(i)=wL,∀i∈[0,IL]
Similar argument for wM and wH.
Given the law of one price (wage) we can also write that
p(i)αL(i)l(i)=p(i′)αL(i′)l(i′),∀i,i′∈[0,IL]
Given the Appendix: derivation of wage equations, it implies that
l(i)=l(i′)=l,∀i,i′∈[0,IL]
Plug it into the market clearing condition for L
L=∫IL0l(i)di=l⋅IL⟹l(i)=l=LIL,∀i∈[0,IL]
Similar argument for m(i)=MIH−IL and h(i)=H1−IH.