| Grade 4 | Grade 5 | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reading | Math | Reading | Math | |
| Class size | -0.150 | 0.023 | -0.582 | -0.443 |
| (0.128) | (0.160) | (0.181) | (0.236) | |
| Mean score | 72.5 | 68.7 | 74.5 | 67.0 |
| SD score | 7.8 | 9.1 | 8.2 | 10.2 |
| Obs. | 415 | 415 | 471 | 471 |
KAT.TAL.322 Advanced Course in Labour Economics
September 15, 2025
Knowledge/productivity doesn’t rise linearly with years of education.
Production process that takes inputs and develops skills.
Source: World Bank
Education output of pupil i in school j in community k
qijk=q(Pi,Sij,Cik)
where Piare pupil characteristicsSijare school inputsCikare non-school inputs
Output
Years of schooling, standardised test scores, noncognitive skills
Student inputs
Effort, patience, genetics, parental characteristics, family income, family size
School inputs
Teacher characteristics, class sizes, teacher-student ratio, school expenditures, school facilities
Non-school inputs
Peers, local economic conditions, national curricula, regulations, certification rules
Achievement of student i in family j at age a
qija=qa(Fij(a),Sij(a),μij0,εija)
Fij(a) history of family inputs up to age a
Sij(a) history of school inputs up to age a
μij0 initial skill endowment
εija measurement error in output
qa(⋅) age-dependent production function
qija=qa(Fija,Sija)+νija
Strong assumptions:
qija=qa(Fija,Sija,qa−1[Fij(a−1),Sij(a−1),μij0,εij,a−1],εija)
Typical empirical estimation assumes linear separability and qa(⋅)=q(⋅):
qija=FijaαF+SijaαS+γqij,a−1+νija
Additional assumptions implied:
Still assume linear separability:
qija=a∑t=1Xijtαaa−t+1+βaμij0+εij(a)
Estimation strategies:
Each with their own caveats
Source: Hanushek (2003), Table 3
Non-experimental estimations
Require strong assumptions
Require rich data
Endogenous allocation of resources
Quasi-experimental estimations
May not recover structural parameters
Ignore general equilibrium
Issues with scaling List (2022)
Source: Neale and Maes (2004)
Meta-analysis of >17,000 twin-analyses (>1,500 cognitive traits)
Exogenous variation due to court decisions or legislative action
Source: Table 10 (Handel and Hanushek 2023)
Large variation of spending effects on test scores
Not clear how money was used
Role of differences in regulatory environments
Similar results for participation rates are all positive (mostly significant)
Quasi-experimental variation in Israel: Maimonides rule
Rule from Babylonian Talmud, interpreted by Maimonides in XII century:
If there are more than forty [students], two teachers must be appointed
Sharp drops in class sizes with 41, 81, … cohort sizes in schools
Regression discontinuity design (RDD)
Source: Figure I (Joshua D. Angrist and Lavy 1999)
Maimonides rule: fsc=Esint(Es−140)+1
“Fuzzy” RDD
First stage: nsc=Xscπ0+fscπ1+ξsc
Second stage: ysc=Xsβ+nscα+ηs+μc+ϵsc
| Grade 4 | Grade 5 | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reading | Math | Reading | Math | |
| Class size | -0.150 | 0.023 | -0.582 | -0.443 |
| (0.128) | (0.160) | (0.181) | (0.236) | |
| Mean score | 72.5 | 68.7 | 74.5 | 67.0 |
| SD score | 7.8 | 9.1 | 8.2 | 10.2 |
| Obs. | 415 | 415 | 471 | 471 |
| Grade 5 | ||
|---|---|---|
| Reading | Math | |
| Class size | -0.006 | -0.062 |
| (0.066) | (0.088) | |
| Mean score | 72.1 | 68.1 |
| SD score | 17.4 | 20.6 |
| Obs. | 225 108 | 226 832 |
Project STAR: 79 schools, 6323 children in 1985-86 cohort in Tennessee
Randomly assigned students and teachers into
Y=α+βSSMALL+βAAIDE+Xδ+ε
Randomization means students between classes are on average similar
⇒βS and βA are causal
| Test scores | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Kindergarten | Grade 1 | Grade 2 | Grade 3 | |
| SMALL | 5.370 | 6.370 | 5.260 | 5.240 |
| (1.190) | (1.110) | (1.100) | (1.040) | |
| Test score, % | College by age 27, % | College quality, $ | Wage earnings, $ | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| SMALL | 4.760 | 1.570 | 109.000 | -124.000 |
| (0.990) | (1.070) | (92.600) | (336.000) | |
| Avg dep var | 48.67 | 45.5 | 27 115 | 15 912 |
| Obs. | 9 939 | 10 992 | 10 992 | 10 992 |
Notice: random assignments of peers (QUAL)
| Test score, % | College by age 27, % | College quality, $ | Wage earnings, $ | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| QUAL | 0.662 | 0.108 | 9.328 | 50.610 |
| (0.024) | (0.053) | (4.573) | (17.450) | |
| Obs. | 9 939 | 10 959 | 10 959 | 10 959 |
Source: Table IX (Chetty et al. 2011)
2-year pilot program in 2007 among lowest-performing schools in NYC
Relative rank of schools in each subscore
Bonus sizes:

Instrumental variable approach (LATE = ATT):
Y=α2+β2X+π2 incentive+ϵincentive=α1+β1X+π1 treatment+ξ
| Elementary | Middle | High | |
|---|---|---|---|
| English | -0.010 (0.015) |
-0.026 (0.010) |
-0.003 (0.043) |
| Math | -0.014 (0.018) |
-0.040 (0.016) |
-0.018 (0.029) |
Change in teacher pay scheme in Wisconsin in 2011:
Main results:
FP ↑ salary of high-quality teachers relative to low-quality
high-quality teachers moved to FP districts (low-quality to SP)
teacher effort ↑ in FP districts relative to SP
student test scores ↑0.06σ (1/3 of effect of ↓ class size by 5)
Admission to elite high school in Boston
Peer math scores, Figure 2 (Abdulkadiroğlu, Angrist, and Pathak 2014)
| Parametric | Nonparametric | |
|---|---|---|
| Attended any college | 0.010 | 0.031 |
| (0.032) | (0.019) | |
| Attended 4-year college | 0.003 | 0.013 |
| (0.041) | (0.026) | |
| Attended competitive college | -0.011 | -0.004 |
| (0.051) | (0.029) | |
| Attended highly competitive college | -0.009 | -0.014 |
| (0.032) | (0.017) |
Dale and Krueger (2002) study admission into selective colleges in the US
Kanninen, Kortelainen, and Tervonen (2023): selective schools in Finland
Pop-Eleches and Urquiola (2013): selective schools and tracks in Romania
RCT among schools in remote areas of Istanbul
Carefully designed curriculum promoting grit (≥2h/week for 12 weeks)
Treated students are more likely to
These effects persist 2.5 years after the intervention
Squicciarini (2020): adoption of technical education in France in 1870-1914
Machin and McNally (2008): ‘literacy hour’ introduced in UK in 1998/99
highly structured framework for teaching
↑ English and reading skills of primary schoolchildren
Academic achievement is complex function of student, parent, school and non-school inputs
Measuring achievement can also be difficult
Genetic and environmental factors from twin studies almost 50/50
Large variation in school resource effects (from ≪0 to ≫0)
Studies of class size, teacher incentives, peer effects and curricula
Another (often overlooked) step is scaling up to the population
Next lecture: Technological shift and labour markets on 17 Sep