2. Labour Supply

KAT.TAL.322 Advanced Course in Labour Economics

Nurfatima Jandarova

August 27, 2025

Labour supply

How people choose

- whether to work, and
- how much to work

Today

- Static model
- Household model
- Intertemporal model
- Estimations

Static model

Model

- Utility from consumption of goods ($m{C}$) and leisure ($m{L}$): $m{U}(m{C}, m{L})$.
- ullet Total time endowment L_0
- Agent chooses h how much time to work such that $L=L_0-h$.
- Budget constraint is $C \le wh + Y \Rightarrow C + wL \le wL_0 + Y$
 - ightarrow w is real hourly wage
 - $\rightarrow Y$ is non-labour income

$$\max_{C,h} U(C, L_0 - h)$$
 subject to $C \le wh + Y$

Allocation of time in the data




FIGURE 1.8

Work, leisure, and home hours per week of men in the United States 1900–2005.

Source: Francis and Ramey (2009).

Men




FIGURE 1.9Work, leisure, and home hours per week of women in the United States 1900–2005.

Source: Francis and Ramey (2009).

Women

Solution


First-order conditions of the Lagrangian are

$$U_C(C,L) = \lambda$$
 $U_L(C,L) = \lambda w$

Solution pair $C^*(w,Y)$ and $h^*(w,Y)$ satisfies

$$\frac{U_L(C^*, L^*)}{U_C(C^*, L^*)} = w$$
 and $C^* = wh^* + Y$

Solution



Comparative statics

How does optimal labour supply change with w?


Marshallian (uncompensated) wage elasticity: $\varepsilon_{hw} = \frac{\partial \ln h^*}{\partial \ln w}$

Hicksian (compensated) wage elasticity: $\eta_{hw} = \frac{\partial \ln h}{\partial \ln w}$

Decomposition into **substitution** and **income** effects:


$$\varepsilon_{hw} = \eta_{hw} + \frac{wh}{Y} \varepsilon_{hY}$$

Comparative statics



Source: Wikipedia

Labour supply curve



Source: Wikipedia

Household model

Intrahousehold labour supply

Unitary model

Household represented by single utility function $U(C,L_1,L_2)$

Budget constraint $C + w_1L_1 + w_2L_2 \le Y_1 + Y_2 + (w_1 + w_2)L_0$

- Simple extension of static model
- Consumption depends on total resources only
- Not consistent with empirical studies

Intrahousehold labour supply

Collective model

Individual utility functions $U_1(C_1,L_1),U_2(C_2,L_2)$

Budget constraint

$$C_1 + C_2 + w_1 L_1 + w_2 L_2 \le R_1 + R_2 + (w_1 + w_2) L_0$$

$$\max_{C_1,C_2,L_1,L_2} U_1(C_1,L_1)$$
 s.t. budget constraint

$$U_2(C_2, L_2) \ge \bar{U}_2$$

Intrahousehold labour supply

Collective model

Chiappori (1992): equivalent to

$$\max_{C_i, L_i} U_i(C_i, L_i) \quad \text{s.t.} \quad C_i + w_i L_i \le w_i L_0 + \Phi_i$$

where Φ_i describes how resources R_1+R_2 are shared in the household.

Intertemporal model

Model

General utility function $U(C_0, \ldots, C_T; L_0, \ldots, L_T)$ (intractable)

Separable utility function $\sum_{t=0}^{T} U(C_t, L_t, t)$

Budget constraint $A_t = (1 + r_t)A_{t-1} + B_t + w_t(1 - L_t) - C_t$

- savings rate r_t
- total time normalized to one: $h_t + L_t = 1$
- assets A_t
- non-labour income B_t

Solution

$$L = \sum_{t} U(C_{t}, L_{t}, t) - \sum_{t} \nu_{t} \left[A_{t} - (1 + r_{t}) A_{t-1} - B_{t} - w_{t} (1 - L_{t}) + C_{t} \right]$$

First-order conditions:

$$\frac{U_L(C_t, L_t, t)}{U_C(C_t, L_t, t)} = w_t v_t = (1 + r_{t+1})v_{t+1}$$

Iterating over all periods: $\ln \nu_t = -\sum_{\tau=1}^t \ln(1+r_\tau) + \ln \nu_0$

Wage elasticities of labour supply

- ullet Frisch elasticity $oldsymbol{\psi}_{hw}$ (holding $oldsymbol{
 u}_t$ constant)
- ullet Marshallian elasticity $oldsymbol{arepsilon}_{holdsymbol{w}}$ (takes into account $oldsymbol{
 u}_t$)
- Hicksian elasticity η_{hw} (holding lifetime utility constant)

It is possible to show that $\psi_{hw} \geq \eta_{hw} \geq \varepsilon_{hw}$

Interpretation

Transitory changes in wages affect labour supply more than permanent changes.

Example

Period utility
$$U(C_t, L_t, t) = \frac{C_t^{1+\rho}}{1+\rho} - \beta_t \frac{H_t^{1+\gamma}}{1+\gamma}$$

FOC:
$$H_t^{\gamma} = \frac{1}{\beta_t} \nu_t w_t \Rightarrow \ln H_t = \frac{1}{\gamma} (-\ln \beta_t + \ln \nu_t + \ln w_t)$$

1. Evolutionary changes along anticipated wage profile $\frac{\partial \ln H_t}{\partial \ln w_t} = \frac{1}{\gamma} > 0$

2. Transitory changes
$$\frac{\partial \ln H_t}{\partial \ln w_t} = \frac{1}{\gamma} \left(1 + \underbrace{\frac{\partial \ln \nu_0}{\partial \ln w_t}}_{<\approx 0} \right) > 0$$

- 3. Permanent changes $\frac{\partial \ln H_t}{\partial \ln w_t} = \frac{1}{\gamma} \left(1 + \frac{\partial \ln \nu_0}{\partial \ln w_t} \right) \le 0$
- 4. Lottery win $\frac{\partial \ln H_t}{\partial \ln B_t} = \frac{1}{\gamma} \frac{\partial \ln \nu_0}{\partial \ln B_t} < 0$

Estimations

Basic regression equation

$$\ln H_{it} = \alpha_w \ln w_{it} + \alpha_R R_{it} + \theta X_{it} + v_{it}$$

Interpretation of $lpha_w$: Frisch, Marshallian or Hicksian? Depends on $R_{\it it}$!

Two-stage budgeting

Solution method of lifecycle labour supply models (Blundell and Macurdy 1999)

- 1. Solve static labour supply model given $C_t = R_t + w_t H_t$
- 2. Solve for series R_1, \ldots, R_T to maximize lifetime utility

$$\ln H_{it} = \alpha_w \ln w_{it} + \alpha_R (C_{it} - w_{it}H_{it}) + \theta X_{it} + v_{it}$$

Marshallian wage elasticity: $lpha_w$

Income effect: $lpha_R \, wH$

Hicksian wage elasticity: $lpha_w - lpha_R \, wH$

Frisch elasticity

Recall that
$$\ln \nu_t = -\sum_{\tau=1}^t \ln(1+r_\tau) + \ln \nu_0 \equiv -\ln(1+r)t + \ln \nu_0$$
 (if $r_\tau = r \ \forall \tau$)

Substitute $\alpha_R R_{it} = \rho t + \alpha_R \ln \nu_{0,i}$ into basic equation:

$$\ln H_{it} = \rho t + \alpha_w \ln w_{it} + \alpha_R \ln v_{0,i} + \theta X_{it} + v_{it}$$

$$\Delta \ln H_{it} = \rho + \alpha_w \Delta \ln w_{it} + \theta \Delta X_{it} + \Delta v_{it}$$

Frisch wage elasticity: $lpha_w$

Practical issues

- Wages and hours worked are endogeneous
- Hours (H|H>0) and participation (H>0)
- Measurement errors
- ullet Measures of C_{it}
- Individual vs aggregate labour supply

Observational data

Table 1.19
Estimates from U.S. nonexperimental data of behavioral responses for men.

	$\boldsymbol{\mathit{E}}$	mpe	E^*
Ashenfelter and Heckman (1973)	-0.16	-0.27	0.12
Bloch (1973)	0.06	-0.06	0.12
Boskin (1973)	-0.29	-0.41	0.12
DaVanzo, DeTray and Greenberg (1973)	-0.15	-0.004	-0.14
Dickinson (1974)	-0.11	0.08	-0.19
Fleisher, Parsons and Porter (1973)	-0.19	-0.23	0.04
Garfinkel (1973)	0	0	0
Greenberg and Kosters (1973)	-0.09	-0.29	0.20
Ham (1982)	-0.16	-0.11	-0.05
Hausman and Ruud (1984)	-0.08	-0.63	0.55
Kniesner (1976a)	-0.17	-0.01	-0.16
Kosters (1966)	-0.09	-0.14	0.04
Masters and Garfinkel (1977)	-0.11	-0.05	-0.06
Wales and Woodland (1979)	0.14	-0.70	0.84

Notes: The estimates reported for DaVanzo, DeTray and Greenberg (1973) correspond to those given on the last line of Table 11 of their Rand report where both the wage rate and nonwage income variables were instrumented. Those for Ham (1982) correspond to those given in column (1) of Table IV of his paper. Those for Kniesner (1976a) apply to those men whose wives were not at work for pay. For Masters and Garfinkel (1977), I took what they described as their "best estimates" of E and the mpe even though the coefficients reported did not derive from the same regression equation. Boskin's (1973) results are those for white men only. Dickinson's (1974) mpe is calculated from his estimate coefficient on "other (nontransfer) family income". Hausman and Ruud's estimates are calculated for a household with an assumed marginal tax rate of 25 percent so the husband's net wage rate is \$4.31 and the wife's net wage rate is \$2.63.

Source: Pencavel (1986)

Experimental data: drop in tax rates in the UK 1978-92

TABLE IV

ELASTICITIES: GROUPING INSTRUMENTS: COHORT AND EDUCATION

		Compensated		Group Means:		
	Wage	Wage	Other Income	Hours	Wage	Income
No Children	0.140 (0.075)	0.140 (0.088)	0.000 (0.041)	32	2.97	88.63
Youngest Child 0-2	0.205 (0.128)	0.301 (0.144)	-0.185 (0.104)	20	3.36	129.69
Youngest Child 3-4	0.371 (0.150)	0.439 (0.159)	-0.173 (0.139)	18	3.10	143.64
Youngest Child 5-10	0.132 (0.117)	0.173 (0.127)	-0.102 (0.109)	21	2.86	151.13
Youngest Child 11 +	0.130 (0.107)	0.160 (0.117)	-0.063 (0.084)	25	2.83	147.31

Note: Asymptotic standard errors in parentheses.

Source: Blundell, Duncan, and Meghir (1998)

Intensive vs extensive margin

		Intensive Margin	Extensive Margin	Aggregate Hours
Steady State (Hicksian)	Micro	0.33	0.25	0.58
	Macro	0.33	0.17	0.50
Intertemporal Substitution (Frisch)	Micro	0.54	0.32	0.86
	Macro	[0.54]	[2.77]	3.31

Notes: Each cell shows a point estimate of the relevant elasticity based on meta analyses of existing micro and macro evidence. Micro estimates are identified from quasi-experimental studies; macro estimates are identified from cross-country variation in tax rates (steady-state elasticities) and business cycle fluctuations (intertemporal substitution elasticities). The aggregate hours elasticity is defined as the sum of the extensive and intensive elasticities. Macro studies report intertemporal aggregate hours elasticities but do not always decompose these values into extensive and intensive elasticities. Therefore, the estimates in brackets show the values implied by the macro aggregate hours elasticity if the intensive Frisch elasticity is chosen to match the micro estimate of 0.54. See appendix C for sources of these estimates.

Source: Chetty et al. (2012)

Also some research on work effort for given hours of work (Dickinson 1999)

Measurement errors

Classical measurement error in w_{it} attenuates the estimate of $lpha_w$

"Denominator bias" $\downarrow \alpha_w$ if wages are computed as ratio of earning and hours with measurement errors. M. P. Keane (2011) computes average Hicksian elasticity

- among all papers: 0.31
- ullet among papers with direct measure of w_{it} : 0.43

Measurement of consumption

PSID (US) dataset only includes food consumption data

Consumption measure	Marshall	Hicks	Income	Frisch
PSID unadjusted	-0.442	0.094	-0.536	0.148
Food + imputed (food prices, demographics)	-0.468	0.328	-0.796	0.535
Food + imputed (house value, rent)	-0.313	0.220	-0.533	0.246

Source: (M. P. Keane 2011, Table 5)

Micro vs macro elasticities

Macro elasticities of labour supply typically higher than micro estimates

M. Keane and Rogerson (2012) highlight:

- extensive vs intensive margin
- model misspecification due to human capital accumulation
- aggregation is not straightforward

Discrete choice dynamic programming

Incorporate discrete choices into model of labour supply

- labour force participation (Eckstein and Wolpin 1989)
- marriage (Van Der Klaauw 1996)
- fertility (Francesconi 2002)

M. P. Keane and Wolpin (2010) combine all + school and welfare participation choices

Uncompensated dynamic elasticity

Eckstein and Wolpin (1989)	5.0
Van Der Klaauw (1996)	3.6
Francesconi (2002)	5.6
M. P. Keane and Wolpin (2010)	2.8

Source: M. P. Keane (2011)

Summary

- Standard models of labour supply
 - → Static model
 - → Household model
 - → Intertemporal model
- Estimates of labour supply elasticities
 - → Typical issues encountered in data
 - → Variation in estimates and possible extensions
- Mostly covered seminal papers, but many ongoing works
 - → Tax and benefit policies
 - → Cross-wage elasticities

References

- Blundell, Richard, Alan Duncan, and Costas Meghir. 1998. "Estimating Labor Supply Responses Using Tax Reforms." *Econometrica* 66 (4): 827–61. https://doi.org/10.2307/2999575.
- Blundell, Richard, and Thomas Macurdy. 1999. "Chapter 27 Labor Supply: A Review of Alternative Approaches." In *Handbook of Labor Economics*, edited by Orley C. Ashenfelter and David Card, 3:1559–1695. Elsevier. https://doi.org/10.1016/S1573-4463(99)03008-4.
- Cahuc, Pierre. 2004. Labor Economics. Cambridge (Mass.): MIT Press.
- Chetty, Raj. 2012. "Bounds on Elasticities with Optimization Frictions: A Synthesis of Micro and Macro Evidence on Labor Supply." *Econometrica* 80 (3): 969–1018. https://www.jstor.org/stable/41493842.
- Chetty, Raj, Adam Guren, Day Manoli, and Andrea Weber. 2012. "Does Indivisible Labor Explain the Difference Between Micro and Macro Elasticities? A Meta-Analysis of Extensive Margin Elasticities." NBER Macroeconomics Annual 27: 1–56. https://doi.org/10.1086/669170.
- Chiappori, Pierre-André. 1992. "Collective Labor Supply and Welfare." *Journal of Political Economy* 100 (3): 437–67. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2138727.
- Dickinson, David L. 1999. "An Experimental Examination of Labor Supply and Work Intensities." *Journal of Labor Economics* 17 (4): 638–70. https://doi.org/10.1086/209934.
- Eckstein, Zvi, and Kenneth I. Wolpin. 1989. "Dynamic Labour Force Participation of Married Women and Endogenous Work Experience." *The Review of Economic Studies* 56 (3): 375–90. https://doi.org/10.2307/2297553.
- Francesconi, Marco. 2002. "A Joint Dynamic Model of Fertility and Work of Married Women." *Journal of Labor Economics* 20 (2): 336–80. https://doi.org/10.1086/338220.

- Keane, Michael P. 2011. "Labor Supply and Taxes: A Survey." *Journal of Economic Literature* 49 (4): 961–1075. https://doi.org/10.1257/jel.49.4.961.
- Keane, Michael P., and Kenneth I. Wolpin. 2010. "The Role of Labor and Marriage Markets, Preference Heterogeneity, and the Welfare System in the Life Cycle Decisions of Black, Hispanic, and White Women." *International Economic Review* 51 (3): 851–92. https://www.jstor.org/stable/40784808.
- Keane, Michael, and Richard Rogerson. 2012. "Micro and Macro Labor Supply Elasticities: A Reassessment of Conventional Wisdom." *Journal of Economic Literature* 50 (2): 464–76. https://doi.org/10.1257/jel.50.2.464.
- Lundberg, Shelly J., Robert A. Pollak, and Terence J. Wales. 1997. "Do Husbands and Wives Pool Their Resources? Evidence from the United Kingdom Child Benefit." *The Journal of Human Resources* 32 (3): 463–80. https://doi.org/10.2307/146179.
- Pencavel, John. 1986. "Chapter 1 Labor Supply of Men: A Survey." In *Handbook of Labor Economics*, 1:3–102. Elsevier. https://doi.org/10.1016/S1573-4463(86)01004-0.
- Ramey, Valerie A., and Neville Francis. 2009. "A Century of Work and Leisure." *American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics* 1 (2): 189–224. https://doi.org/10.1257/mac.1.2.189.
- Van Der Klaauw, Wilbert. 1996. "Female Labour Supply and Marital Status Decisions: A Life-Cycle Model." *The Review of Economic Studies* 63 (2): 199–235. https://doi.org/10.2307/2297850.