Does intelligence shield children from the effects of parental unemployment?

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Research question	Analysis	Results		
Parental job loss reduces children's • education	Difference-in-differences framework	- Parent unemp is more harmful for education at high IQ		
labour-market outcomeswell-being, beliefs	Understanding Society (UK) data • wave 3 (2011-13)	• Children start at lower-paying jobs		
		• Switch to stable and better-paying jobs later		
New evidence	• parent unemp at age 14 (UP)	• Wages continue to suffer from foregone education		
How does intelligence change these effects?	• intelligence score (IQ)			

Y - outcome, UP - parental unemployment indicator; IQ - intelligence score

Descriptive evidence

 $\operatorname{Gap} = \mathbb{E}(Y|UP = 1) - \mathbb{E}(Y|UP = 0)$



Difference-in-differences

 $Y = \beta_0 + \beta_1 UP + \beta_2 IQ + {\pmb\beta}_3 UP \times IQ + \beta_4 {\bf X} + \varepsilon$

Parallel trends assumption

Selection bias constant across intelligence Y^0 potential outcome when parents stay employed Y^1 potential outcome when parents are unemployed

$$\frac{Cov(Y^0,IQ|UP=1)}{Var(IQ|UP=1)} = \frac{Cov(Y^0,IQ|UP=0)}{Var(IQ|UP=0)}$$

Causal interpretation

Change in causal effect of UP as IQ increases

$$\beta_3 = \frac{\partial \mathbb{E}(Y^1 - Y^0 | IQ, UP = 1)}{\partial IQ}$$

Validity

- Support parallel trends using observed Y^0
- Causal interpretation with IQ as outcome

$$\beta_3 = \frac{\partial \mathbb{E}(Y^1 - Y^0 | IQ^1, UP = 1)}{\partial IQ^1}$$

- Attenuation bias due to measurement error in IQ
- Robustness checks:
 - cohorts born before 1981 (less recall bias)
 - only white British
 - separate by UK country
 - replication in the BCS70

Results

• Parent unemp is more harmful for education of children with higher IQ

	Dependent variables				
	Post-16 school	Degree	Uni degree		
Parent unemp	-0.085*** (0.013)	-0.039*** (0.012)	-0.028** (0.012)		
IQ	0.137^{***} (0.004)	$\begin{array}{c} 0.131^{***} \\ (0.003) \end{array}$	0.095^{***} (0.006)		
Parent unemp \times IQ	-0.041 ^{†††} (0.011)	-0.036 ^{†††} (0.010)	-0.033 ^{†††} (0.010)		
Obs.	20,202	20,202	20,202		

 $^{\dagger}{\rm q}$ < 0.1; $^{\dagger\dagger}{\rm q}$ < 0.05; $^{\dagger\dagger\dagger}{\rm q}$ < 0.01 based on FDR q-values

*p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01 based on conventional p-values

- Higher IQ mitigates the effect of parent unemp on labour supply and earnings
- Start at lower-paying jobs and switch to better-paying over time

Employer-learning theory (Farber and Gibbons 1996) Productivity-enhancing role of education (Aryal, Bhuller, and Lange 2022)

• Wages continue to suffer from foregone earnings

		Dependent variables					
	Work	$\%\Delta$ earnings	$\%\Delta$ hourly wage	Hours	First job rank	Current job rank	
Parent unemp	-0.063*** (0.012)	-24.978*** (3.890)	-12.333*** (1.010)	-2.787^{***} (0.489)	-0.041*** (0.012)	-1.049^{***} (0.204)	
IQ	0.053^{***} (0.004)	30.032^{***} (1.302)	$ \begin{array}{c} 18.392^{***} \\ (0.357) \end{array} $	1.896^{***} (0.143)	0.030^{***} (0.003)	0.888^{***} (0.060)	
Parent unemp \times IQ	0.047 ^{†††} (0.012)	13.258 ^{†††} (4.085)	-5.371 ^{†††} (1.061)	$\begin{array}{c} 1.560^{\dagger\dagger\dagger}\\ (0.439) \end{array}$	0.004 (0.011)	0.881 ^{†††} (0.196)	
Obs.	20,202	20,202	15,589	20,202	16,374	20,201	

 $^{\dagger}\mathrm{q}<0.1;\,^{\dagger\dagger}\mathrm{q}<0.05;\,^{\dagger\dagger\dagger}\mathrm{q}<0.01$ based on FDR q-values

*p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01 based on conventional p-values

Conclusions

- Higher IQ mitigates the effects of parental unemployment on labour supply and earnings
- Higher IQ exacerbates the losses in education and wages due to parental unemployment
- The initial loss in education and sustained penalty on wages suggests room for policy

References

Aryal, Gaurab, Manudeep Bhuller, and Fabian Lange. 2022. "Signaling and Employer Learning with Instruments." American Economic Review 112 (5): 1669–1702. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20200146.

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- Farber, Henry S., and Robert Gibbons. 1996. "Learning and Wage Dynamics." The Quarterly Journal of Economics 111 (4): 1007–47. https://doi.org/10.2307/2946706.

Dynamic complementarity of human capital investments (Cunha and Heckman 2007)